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1956] EsTOPPEL AND CROWN PRIVILEGE 
ESTOPPEL AND CROWN PRIVILEGE IN 
ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Bernard Schwartz* 
27 
PERHAPS the most anachronistic doctrine in Anglo-American public law is that of sovereign immunity. Under it, the State is 
placed in a privileged position of immunity from the principles 
of law which are binding upon the ordinary citizen, unless it ex-
pressly consents to be bound by such principles. In Anglo-Ameri-
can law the infallibility attributed to the King in the days when 
he was personally sovereign has been more recently recognized in 
the State, which the Crown now merely personifies. Thus, even 
today, and even in the American democracy, the basic principle 
of public law is that the King can do no wrong.1 
That the doctrine of sovereign immunity is inconsistent with 
the rule of law has long been recognized. "Whether this immunity 
is an absolute survival of the monarchical privilege, or is a mani-
festation merely of power, or rests on abstract logical grounds, ... 
it undoubtedly runs counter to modem democratic notions of the 
moral responsibility of the State," Justice Frankfurter has as-
serted.2 Sovereign immunity has tended to dualize Anglo-Ameri-
can public law by treating cases against the State as wholly distinct 
from those governed by the ordinary law, to be dealt with on wholly 
different principles. Legal concepts have not been applicable, 
without the State's express consent, to cases governed by the sover-
eign immunity doctrine. The result has been a system of public 
law dualist in essence. Different rules apply to cases in which the 
State is a party, different consequences flow from acts of the State, 
and cases in which the responsibility of the State is at issue are re-
moved from the cognizance of the courts. In such a system the 
State has, in effect, been placed upon a higher plane than the in-
dividual, with complete immunity given to its acts qua State acts. 
Criticism of the sovereign immunity doctrine has, until now, 
been focused almost entirely upon its effects on the law of public tort 
and contract liability. It has, not unnaturally, been assumed that 
with the enactment of statutes like the Crown Proceedings Act, 
• Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law, New York 
University; B.S.S. 1944, College of the City of New York, LL.B. 1944, New York University, 
LL.M. 1945, Harvard, Ph.D. 1947, Cambridge.-Ed. 
1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 797 (1951). 
2Dissenting in Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Read, 332 U.S. 47 at 59, 64 S.Ct. 873 (1944). 
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1947, in Britain, and the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 in the 
United States, under which most of the sovereign's immunity to 
suit has been waived, the lacuna in the rule of law3 caused by the 
sovereign immunity doctrine has been completely filled. What 
is not generally realized, however, is that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity is a pervasive one, whose effects in Anglo-American 
public law have not been limited to the field of public tort and 
contract liability. Outside that field, the law has remained un-
altered by laws like the Crown Proceedings Act, whose operation 
does not affect the privileged position which the State still enjoys, 
as compared to the private individual, in many aspects of our 
public law. 
Most important in this respect in its practical effects on the 
dealings of the citizen with the administration is the privileged 
position of the State as far as the doctrine of estoppel and the com-
pulsory production of evidence are concerned. Here are two 
aspects of sovereign immunity that continue to hamper the private 
individual engaged in administrative-law litigation and to impede 
the courts in their endeavor to administer equal justice as between 
State and citizen. The privileged position of the State with regard 
to the representations of its agents and the production of evidence 
indicates that the lacuna in the rule of law caused by the sovereign 
immunity doctrine still needs some filling. As far as estoppel and 
Crown privilege are concerned, the King can still do no wrong. 
, Estoppel 
The importance ,of estoppel in the field of administrative law 
arises from the significant role that the advisory function has come 
to play in present-day administration. Unlike the legislature, 
which is normally empowered solely to enact laws, the modern 
administration is vested not merely with powers of delegated legis-
lation, but also with the power to interpret the law that it has 
made as well as the statutes under which it operates. Such inter-
pretations constitute a large part of the work of administration on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
Administrative interpretations of the law are made known not 
only through agency exercises of powers of delegated legislation 
and adju9,icatory authority. The administration may also render 
s So characterized in Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers 112, Cmd., 4060 
(1932). 
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what amounts to an advisory ruling or opinion for a particular 
individual. "Increasingly there is a tendency to ask the man from 
the Ministry what the position is. Does this work need a license? 
Does that want planning permission? Ought I to pay contributions 
at this rate, or that?"4 Administrative advice enables those subject 
to governmental authority to learn how the agency concerned will 
interpret the law in cases involving them. "The value to the public 
of this means of guidance in advance of action is apparent,"5 and 
the practice of issuing advice has become widespread in present-day 
administration. 
Is administrative advice reliable? As a practical matter, the pri-
vate individual who seeks and receives official advice will comply 
with such advice, unless, that is, he is willing to assume the burden 
and expense of challenging the advice in the courts. The adminis-
trative agency concerned will, of course, also respect its own advice 
in the vast majority of cases. Situations can and do arise, however, 
where, because of changes in personnel or policy, the administra-
tion repudiates its own advisory rulings and refuses to be bound 
by them. In such cases, are the private citizens protected because 
of their reliance upon the ~dministrative advice? Is the adminis-
tration estopped from denying the correctness of the prior advice 
which it itself has given? 
The United States Supreme Court has answered these ques-
tions with a categorical negative in the well-known case of Federal 
Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill.6 The defendant was a 
government-owned corporation created to insure producers of 
wheat against crop losses due to unavoidable causes, including 
drought. It promulgated a regulation, published in the Federal 
Register, specifying the conditions upon which it would insure 
wheat crops, including a provision making "spring wheat which 
has been reseeded on winter wheat acreage" ineligible for insur-
ance. Without actual knowledge of this provision, plaintiff, who 
was a wheat grower, applied to defendant corporation's local agent 
for insurance on his crop, informing the local agent that most of 
it was spring wheat being reseeded on winter wheat acreage. The 
agent advised plaintiff that the entire crop was insurable and, acting 
on his recommendation, the corporation accepted plaintiff's appli-
-i Mitchell, "The Anatomy and Pathology of the Constitution," 67 JURID. R.Ev. 1 at 18 
(1955). 
5 BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN NEW YORK 262 (1942). 
6 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. I (1947). 
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cation for insurance. Two months later, plaintiff's crop was de-
stroyed by drought, but the corporation refused to pay the loss, 
when it learned that the destroyed acreage had been reseeded. 
In plaintiff's suit to recover on the crop insurance policy, the cor-
poration contended that it was not in any way bound by the rep-
resentation of its local agent that plaintiff's crop was insurable. 
The Supreme Court agreed with this contention, asserting that, 
even though a private insurance company would be bound on 
similar facts, the same was not true of a government corporation 
engaged in the insurance field. "It is too late in the day," said 
Justice Frankfurter, "to urge that the Government is just another 
private litigant, for purposes- of charging it with liability, whenever 
it takes over a business theretofore conducted by private enter-
prise or engages in competition with private ventures."7 The 
government corporation in a case like this is treated as an agency 
of the United States and is vested with the sovereign's immunity 
to a doctrine like estoppel. The plaintiff was bound by the pro-
vision in defendant's regulations even though he had no actual 
knowledge of its existence and even though he, not unnaturally, 
relied on the advice of defendant's own agent that his crop was 
insurable. "Men must tum square comers when they deal with 
the Govemment."8 
In a celebrated dissent, Justice Jackson rejected the notion that 
a government agency like the defendant in this case should occupy 
a position more privileged than that of a private insurance com-
pany in an analogous case. If a private company would be es-
topped on similar facts from denying the representations of its 
agents, he said, there is no reason why the same should not be 
true of a government corporation. "It is very well to say that those 
who deal with the Government should tum square comers. But 
there is no reason why the square comers should constitute a one-
way street."9 
The problem of estoppel just discussed, which produced such 
a sharp conflict of opinion in the highest American Court, has 
arisen as well in English cases, and the English judges also have 
not been united in their approach to its solution. Lord Justice 
Denning, with characteristic forthrightness, has strongly urged the 
view that an administrative agency is bound by the doctrine of 
7Id. at 383. 
8Id. at 385, quoting Roel< Island A. 8: L.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141 at 143, 
41 S.Ct. 55 (1920). ' 
9 Id. at 387-388. 
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estoppel upon the same basis as is a private individual. In Robert-
son v. Minister of Pensions,10 the appellant, a serving army officer, 
wrote to the War Office regarding a disability of his and received 
a reply, dated April 8, 1941, stating: "Your disability has been 
accepted as attributable to military service." Relying on that assur-
ance he forbore to obtain an independent medical opinion on his 
own behalf. The Minister of Pensions later decided that the appel-
lant's disability was not attributable to war service, and the pen-
sions appeal tribunal affirmed that decision. The appellant ap-
pealed, contending that the War Office letter of April 8, 1941, 
estopped the Minister of Pensions from denying that the appel-
lant's disability was attributable to war service. Denning, J. (as 
he then was) declared, "If this was a question between subjects, a 
person who gave such an assurance as that contained in the War 
Office letter would be held bound by it unless he could show that 
it was made under the influence of a mistake or induced by a mis-
representation or the like. No such defence is made here. "11 The 
War Office letter, his Lordship went on, was, on the face of it, 
an authoritative decision intended to be binding and intended to 
be acted on. And the appellant did, on the faith of the letter, for-
bear from getting a medical opinion. "That is sufficient to make 
the letter binding. The case falls within the principle that if a man 
gives a promise or assurance which he intends to be binding on 
him, and to be acted on by the person to whom it is given, then, 
once it is acted upon, he is bound by it."12 
Having come thus far, the learned judge then had to decide 
whether the administration was immune from the doctrine of 
estoppel that would bind the ordinary citizen upon analogous 
facts. Denning, J., explicitly rejected the notion that there was 
any such administrative immunity. "The Crown cannot escape," 
said he, "by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown, for that 
doctrine has long been exploded."13 It is interesting to note that 
the reasoning of Denning, J., in his Robertson judgment is dia-
metrically opposed to that of the American Supreme Court in the 
already-discussed Merrill case. The American Court rejected the 
view that the wheat farmer could rely on the administrative assur-
ance which he had received. It was up to the farmer to determine 
whether that assurance was authorized by the applicable statutes 
10 [1949] 1 K.B. 2Zl at 228. 
11 Id. at 230. 
12 Id. at 231. 
1a Ibid. 
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and regulations. In the Robertson case, his Lordship treated the 
assur4nce which the appellant had received from the War Office 
in a wholly different manner. "Can it be seriously suggested," he 
asked, "that, having got that assurance, he was not entitled to rely 
on it? In my opinion if a government department in its dealings 
with a subject takes it upon itself to assume authority upon a mat-
ter with which he is concerned, he is entitled to rely upon it having 
the authority which it assumes. He does not know, and cannot be 
expected to know, the limits of its authority."14 
The view thus expressed by Denning, J., in Robertson v. Min-
ister of Pensions was reiterated by him after his elevation to the 
Court of Appeal in Falmouth Boat Construction Co. v. Howezz.us 
The plaintiffs there were ship repairers who had, at defendant's 
order, done alterations and repairs at Falmouth to a naval vessel, 
bought by defendants for conversion into a passenger-carrying ship. 
The work done by plaintiffs was done after inspection by, and 
with the oral permission of, the licensing officer for the Admiralty 
~t Falmouth. The officer in question was the licensing officer for 
the Admiralty under the Restriction of Repairs of Ships Order, 
1940, and was expressly authorized by the Admiralty to sign li-
censes on their behalf. Under the 1940 order referred to, the 
Admiralty, acting under regulation 55 of the Defence (General) 
Regulations, 1939, required that no person whose business was the 
repair or alteration of ships was to carry out in the United King-
dom any repairs or alterations to ships otherwise than at the order 
of any government department "except under the authority of a 
licence granted," by the Admiralty. The plaintiffs, it should be 
noted, did eventually receive a written license, but the work at 
issue had been done before that time. The case under discussion 
arose out of an action by the plaintiffs to recover for the alteration 
and repairs done to defendant's ship. Defendant pleaded that, 
since the work had been done without a written license, it was 
illegal under the 1940 order, and that what was done in contra-
vention of the law could not be made the subject-matter of an 
action. 
Bucknill and Singleton, L.J.J., were of the opinion that the word 
"license" in the 1940 order was not to be construed as limited to a 
formal, written license, but as including oral permission to carry 
out alterations and repairs to ships; consequently, the work which 
14 Id. at 232. 
15 [1950] 2 K.B. 16. 
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had been done by plaintiffs was not in contravention of the law. 
Denning, L.J ., in his judgment, went further and assumed that 
defendant was right in his contention that the order restricting the 
repairs of ships postulated a license in writing. But this did not 
mean that the plaintiffs had violated the law. 
"They acted on what they were told by the licensing officer. 
They did not know what orders had actually been made by the 
Admiralty, or what variations had been made in them. They 
had no means of knowing the orders, or at any rate they had 
no sure means, because the Admiralty were not bound to pub-
lish them. They could only rely on what they were told by the 
licensing officer. Can it be seriously suggested, that, having 
relied on him, they have been guilty of an offence? In my judg-
ment, there is a principle of law which protects them from 
such an injustice. It is a principle of particular importance in 
these days when the officers of government departments are 
given much authority by orders and circulars which are not 
available to the public. The principle is this: whenever gov-
ernment officers, in their dealings with a subject, take on them-
selves to assume authority in a matter with which he is con-
cerned, the subject is entitled to rely on their having the au-
thority which they assume. He does not know and cannot be 
expected to know the limits of their authority, and he ought 
not to suffer if they exceed it."16 
This was, of course, an exact restatement by Lord Justice Den-
ning of his view articulated in the Robertson case-that a private 
individual should be protected if he relies upon the advice or assur-
ance given him by an administrative officer or agency. The admin-
istration, in such a case, should be bound exactly as an ordinary 
citizen is bound when someone acts upon a promise or assurance 
made by him. In Lord Justice Denning's approach, there is no 
room for treating the administration any differently from a private 
individual as far as estoppels against it are concerned. 
The House of Lords has, however, indicated that it disagrees 
with Lord Justice Denning's view on the point under discussion. 
In the Falmouth Boat Construction Co. case, the highest British 
tribunal did, it is true, affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal.17 
But it did so upon the ground that the license in writing which 
plaintiffs had ultimately obtained covered work already done un-
der the oral sanction of the proper authority as well as work to be 
16 Id. at 25-26. 
17 [1951] A.C. 887. 
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done in the future. Since, under this holding, the written license 
had a retrospective effect, it followed that all of the work done by 
plaintiffs had been formally licensed and was hence manifestly in 
accordance with law. There were, it should be noted, only two 
opinions delivered by the House of Lords in this case, which were 
concurred. in by the rest of that tribunal, and both of the learned 
lords who expressed their views went out of their way to state their 
specific disagreement with the theory upon which Lord Justice 
Denning had rested his judgment in the Court of Appeal. Lord 
Simonds referred to the basic principle, already quoted, which 
Lord Justice Denning had articulated in Robertson's case and re-
iterated in his Falmouth Boat Construction Co. judgment, namely, 
that under which a citizen is entitled to rely on government offi-
cials having the authority which they assert when, in their dealings 
with the citizen, they take on themselves to assume authority in a mat-
ter with which he is concerned: Lord Simonds flatly declared, "My 
Lords, I know of no such principle in our law nor was any authority 
for it cited. . . . The question is whether the character of an act 
done in face of a statutory prohibition is affected by the fact that it 
has been induced by a misleading assumption of authority. In my 
opinion the answer is clearly No. Such an answer may make more 
difficult the task of the citizen who is anxious to walk in the narrow 
way, but that does not justify a different answer being given."18 
Substantially the same opinion was expressed by Lord Normand, 
who likewise rejected Lord Justice Denning's view that the Crown 
was barred by the representations made by the licensing officer 
and acted on by plaintiffs. As his Lordship puts it, "it is certain 
that neither a minister nor any subordinate officer of the Crown 
can by any conduct or representation bar the Crown from enforc-
ing a statutory prohibition or entitle the subject to maintain that 
there has been no breach of it."19 
The opinions delivered in the House of Lords in the Falmouth 
Boat Construction Co. case indicate that the view of the highest 
British tribunal on the question of whether the administration 
should be estopped from denying the correctness of representations 
made by its agents to private individuals who rely upon such rep-
resentations is substantially similar to that articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in the already-discussed case of the 
American wheat farmer. On neither side of the Atlantic does the 
18 Id. at 845. 
19 Id. at 849. 
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citizen appear to be protected by his reliance upon administrative 
advice or assurances. Undoubtedly, as the American Court con-
ceded in the Merrill case, this may make for hardship in particular 
cases. But, to paraphrase Lord Simonds, the fact that the accepted 
rule may make more difficult the task of the citizen is not felt to 
justify either court in adopting a different rule. 
What is it that has led both the English and American courts to 
reject in the field of administrative law a doctrine like estoppel 
that accords so fully with our sense of justice in private-law cases? 
Both courts feel that there is a fundamental difference, in this re-
spect, between the administration and a private principal acting 
through an agent. When an ordinary citizen clothes his agent with 
apparent authority, he is estopped from denying that the agent 
was actually authorized, where his conduct has led another to 
change his position. In such a case, the only interests at stake are 
those of the parties concerned and it would be unjust for the third 
party to be left without a remedy against the principal whose con-
duct had led him to act to his detriment. The same is not true 
when the principal in the case happens to be an administrative 
agency. As the United States Supreme Court has expressed it, 
"Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone 
entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk 
of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for 
the Government stays within the bounds of his authority."20 Un-
like the case involving only an ordinary principal and agent, there 
is more than mere private interests at stake when the administra-
tion acts through its agents. In such cases, the entire community 
has a vital concern in ensuring that administrative agents do not 
act beyond the bounds of the actual authority delegated to them 
by law. If such agents can bind the administration by their acts, 
even though such acts are not clearly within the scope of their 
authority, there is danger that they will assume powers not actually 
delegated to them, knowing that their governmental principal will 
not be able to disavow even such acts. The doctrine of estoppel 
could thus be used to give de facto validity to ultra vi res adminis-
trative acts. This, at any rate, appears to be the fear that has in-
duced the courts on both sides of the Atlantic to refuse to bind the 
administration by the advice or assurances given by its agents. 
That the fear referred to has, in fact, been a strong inq.ucement 
in the minds of the judges is shown by the language of Lord 
20Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 at 384, 68 S.Ct. 1 (1947). 
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Greene, M.R., in a judgment rejecting the contention that the 
Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries was estopped from denying 
that a tenancy had been created with regard to certain land which 
he had taken possession of. Defendant's counsel, said Lord Greene 
in the judgment referred to, "suggested, first of all, that even as-
suming, as he conceded, that the regulations gave no power to 
the Minister to create a tenancy, nevertheless the Minister was 
estopped from denying that the document in question did create 
a tenancy and, accordingly the relationship must be regarded as 
one of landlord and tenant. There is, I think, a very short answer 
to that. Accepting the view which Mr. Bailleu . . . accepts, that 
the Minister had no power under the regulations to grant a ten-
ancy, it is perfectly manifest to my mind that he could not by 
estoppel give himself such power. The power given to an authority 
under a statute is limited to the four corners of the power given. 
It would entirely destroy the whole doctrine of ultra vires if it was 
possible for the donee of a statutory power to extend his power 
by creating an estoppel.''21 It may well be that, on similar facts, 
a private individual would have been estopped. But the Minister 
is a statutory body and can only perform the acts which he is em-
. powered to perform.22 An estoppel cannot be worked against him 
lest he be tempted to create estoppels to extend his own authority. 
As Professor Mitchell has aptly expressed it, the above reason-
ing, which results in the denial of any remedy, has the beauty of 
logic and the ugliness of injustice.23 Yet, even if it is sufficient to 
justify the courts in refusing to apply the doctrine of estoppel in 
cases where the administrative agent has gone beyond his statutory 
authority, one wonders whether that consideration applies as well 
to the House of Lords and American Supreme Court decisions 
which have been discussed. In both the Falmouth Boat Construc-
tion Co. and Merrill cases, it was not a statute, but an administra-
tive regulation, which was violated by the action of the administra-
tive agents. In such a situation the perils adverted to by Lord 
Greene above do not appear to exist. Where it is the administrative 
agency's own regulation, rather than a statute, that limits the 
agent's authority, there is no danger that the working of an estoppel 
will enable the administration to extend its own statutory au-
21 Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries v. Hulkin, unreported, quoted in Minister of 
Agriculture and Fisheries v. Matthews, [1950] 1 K.B. 148 at 153-154. 
22 Id. at 153, per Cassels, J. 
23 Mitchell, "The Anatomy and Pathology of the Constitution," 67 JURID. R.Ev. I at 
~~~ . 
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thority. It is true that, in the normal case, an administrative organ 
should be bound by its own rules and regulations, whose terms 
should be adhered to in every case to which they are applicable. 
That principle should, however, give way in order to prevent in-
justice to one whom an administrative official has led to rely upon 
advice or assurance to his detriment. In such a case, there is no 
real public interest to justify refusing to estop the administration 
from denying the correctness of the advice or assurance given. 
' It is interesting to note that, in the United States, notwithstand-
ing the case-law illustrated by the already-discussed Merrill deci-
. sion, Congress decided that the federal government ought to be 
estopped by the acts of some of its agents and that at least some 
misled citizens ought to be protected in these cases. An Act of 194 7 
provides that employers are not to be held liable for failure to pay 
the wages required by certain labor laws, if the failure was ba~ed 
· upon good faith reliance upon rulings of designated Labor Depart-
ment officials. In addition, some American agencies themselves 
have provided by regulation for similar inroads upon the "no 
estoppel against government" doctrine.24 Thus, the agencies 
established to administer price controls in the United States both 
during and after the last war provided in their regulations for non-
liability where a violation of the law was based upon good faith 
reliance upon advice given by agency officials. 
American administrative lawyers have gone even further and 
asked "whether all this experience does not justify more inclusive 
legislation to protect people who rely on official advice. For if 
immunity is feasible in such eruptive fields as labor law and price 
control, why not also in most other regulatory fields?"25 A recent 
official study has taken cognizance of this sentiment and recom-
mended the enactment by Congress of the following statutory 
provision: 
" ... No sanction shall be imposed by any agency for any 
act done or omitted in good faith by any person in conformity 
with, or in reliance upon, any rule, or any advisory letter, 
opinion, or other written statement of the agency addressed in 
writing to such person and obtained by him without fraud _or 
material misrepresentation, notwithstanding the fact that, 
after such act or omission has taken place, such rule, or such 
letter, opinion, or other written statement is modified, 
24 Newman, "Should Official Advice Be Reliable? Proposals as to Estoppel and Re-
lated Doctrines in Administrative Law," 53 CoL. L. REv. 374 at 375 (1953). 
25 Id. at 376. 
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amended, rescinded, revoked, or held invalid by the agency 
for any reason."26 
It is not suggested that a statutory provision like that just 
quoted is necessarily one which should be enacted verbatim into 
the British statute-book. At the same time, it can hardly be denied 
that the law laid down in the speeches delivered in the House of 
Lords in the Falmouth Boat Construction Co. case does make 
matters most difficult for the private citizen who may be misled 
by administrative advice or assurances. It is true that the quanti-
tative aspect,of the problem under discussion should not be over-
emphasized. Only rarely will the administration fail to respect 
its own rulings, and businessmen and others constantly make deci-
sions based on administrative advice that is adhered to by all con-
cerned. Yet, as a leading American proponent of a statute pro-
tecting those who rely on administrative advice well puts it, 
"occasionally people have been hurt by retroactive action, and it 
can safely be assumed that numerous planned transactions rest 
inchoate, for the sole reasons that the parties are afraid to rely on 
statements which are not legally binding. The proposed statute 
would provide something other than a graveyard for these plans, 
something more than sympathy for people who will in the future 
be misled. Further, when there is honest dispute on such facts 
as 'conformity,' 'good faith' and 'reliance,' why should the Govern-
ment's lawyers be allowed to circumvent a holding on the merits 
of these issues by retreating to the 'no estoppel against govern-
ment' doctrine?"27 There is certainly much to be said for the view 
that, while, as the American Court stated in an already-quoted 
passage,28 men must turn square corners when they deal with the 
government, the government should be held to a like standard of 
rectangular rectitude when dealing with its citizens.29 In its role 
as counselor, the administration, like the ordinary citizen, ought 
to be required to stand by its word, honorably.30 
26 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task 
Force Report on Legal Services and Procedure 375 (1955). 
21 Newman, "Should Official Advice Be Reliable?" 53 CoL. L R.Ev. 374 at 388-389 
(1953). 
2s Note 8 supra. 
29 Maguire and Zimet, "Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal Taxation," 
48 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1281 at 1299 (1935). 
so Newman, "Should Official Advice Be Reliable?" 53 CoL. L. R.Ev. 374 at 389 (1953). 
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Crown Privilege 
The privileged position of the State in Britain with regard to 
the compulsory production of evidence is usually referred to as 
the rule of "Crown privilege." Its place in modern British law 
was conclusively confirmed in the celebrated decision of the House 
of Lords in Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co.31 That case arose 
out of the sinking with great loss of life of the submarine Thetis, 
which sank just before the last war while engaged in a trial dive. 
The Thetis had been built by respondents under contract with 
the Admiralty. A large number of actions were brought against 
respondents by the personal representatives of the deceased, claim-
ing damages for negligence. Respondents objected to producing 
a number of documents which came into their custody in their 
capacity of contractors to the Admiralty. The documents in ques-
tion included ( either in original or as a copy) the contract for the 
hull and machinery of the Thetis, letters written before the dis-
aster relating to the vessel's trim, reports as to the condition of the 
Thetis when raised, a large number of plans and specifications 
relating to various parts of the vessel, and a notebook of a foreman 
painter employed by the respondents. As Viscount Simon pithily 
expressed it, some five years after the judgment of the House of 
Lords was delivered, "what was desired there by the plaintiffs was 
to have produced to them then and there the blue prints which 
would have shown exactly how the submarine Thetis was con-
structed. "32 
The respondents had been directed by the Treasury Solicitor 
not to produce the documents and to object to production thereof 
on the ground of Crown privilege. An affidavit of the First Lord 
of the Admiralty was submitted in which he stated: "All the said 
documents were considered by me with the assistance of my tech-
nical advisers and I formed the opinion that it would be injurious 
to the public interest that any of the said documents should be 
disclosed to any person." The appellants took out a summons, 
calling on the respondents to give inspection of the documents, 
but the House of Lords, affirming the decisions below, held that 
inspection should not be ordered. The governing principle of 
the case, as stated in the speech of Viscount Simon, L.C., was "that 
a court of law ought to uphold an objection, taken by a public 
department when called on to produce documents in a suit be-
s1 [1942] A.C. 624. 
32146 Lords Deb., 5th ser., cols. 927-928. 
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tween private citizens, that, on grounds of public policy, the docu-
ments should not be produced."33 
Dean Roscoe Pound, in a contemporary analysis of Duncan v. 
Gammell, Laird & Co., declared that the result reached seems 
sound.34 The blue prints which showed how a naval submarine 
was constructed were certainly not matters to be laid open to public 
inspection, above all in time of war. This was especially true of 
the case of the Thetis, as a speech of Viscount Simon delivered in 
1947 has informed us. "I do not think," said he, "I am disclosing 
any secret nowadays when I say that if those blue prints had been 
produced it would have appeared that submarines of the type of 
the Thetis were not only armed so that they could fire forwards 
under the water but that there were also further tubes which could 
fire from behind. That was a secret and we were at war with the 
Germans. I have not the slightest doubt that the First Lord of 
the Admiralty was justified when after considering this particular 
circumstance, he came to the conclusion that he should say, 'I am 
sorry, but I must claim privilege for these particular blue 
prints.' "35 · 
The bare holding of their lordships that inspection of the 
Thetis documents should not be compelled is, on these facts, one 
which few people would dispute. What is more debatable is 
whether Viscount Simon did not go too far in his Duncan v. Gam-
mell, Laird & Co. opinion in enunciating a rule of complete judi-
cial abnegation in cases where Crown privilege is claimed. In the 
Duncan case itself, it should be noted, the House of Lords upheld 
the claim of Crown privilege, although the documents at issue had 
not been inspected by any court. Their lordships repudiated the 
holdings in several earlier cases under which the judge might 
properly probe the objection by himself examining the docu-
ments.36 Particularly significant in this respect was the express 
refusal to follow the decision of the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council in Robinson v. State of South Australia,31 where it 
was held expressly that a court should look at the documents in 
order to see whether their production would really be prejudicial 
to the public welfare. "I cannot agree with this view," declared 
Lord Simon of this Robinson holding.38 On the contrary, said 
33 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 at 626-627 and 632. 
34 56 HARV. L. REv. 806 at 813 (1943). 
35146 Lords Deb., 5th ser., cols. 927-928. 
36 See Street, "State Secrets-A Comparative Study," 14 Mon. L. REv. 121 at 122 (1951). 
37 [1931] A.C. 704. 
as Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 at 641. 
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his lordship, a court is not competent to go behind the claim of 
Crown privilege made by the head of a government department. 
Thus, the affidavit of the First Lord of the Admiralty that it was 
contrary to the public interest for the Thetis documents to be open 
to inspection by appellants was conclusive and there were no cir-
cumstances in which the judge could himself look at the documents 
before ruling as to their production. Viscount Simon quotes 
with approval the strong language of Pollock, C. B., in an earlier 
case: 
"We are of opinion that, if the production of a state paper 
would be injurious to the public service, the general public 
interest must be considered paramount to the individual in-
terest of a suitor in a court of justice; and the question then 
arises, how is this to be determined? It is manifest it must be 
determined either by the presiding judge, or by the respon-
sible servant of the Crown in whose custody the paper is. The 
judge would be unable to determine it without ascertaining 
what the document was, and why the publication of it would 
be injurious to the public service-an inquiry which cannot 
take place in private, and which taking place in public may 
do all the mischief which it is proposed to guard against. It 
appears to us, therefore, that the question, whether the pro-
duction of the documents would be injurious to the public 
service, must be determined, not by the judge but by the head 
of the department having the custody of the paper .... "39 
It is true that Lord Simon also articulates the principles which, in 
his opinion, ought to govern Ministers in deciding whether to claim 
Crown privilege in particular cases.40 But this rather platitu-
dinous statement41 of his lordship is, in the words of one com-
mentator, "not binding as a matter of law."42 Certainly the state-
ment by Viscount Simon of these principles hardly changes the 
legal effect of his judgment, which is to leave the whole matter of 
Crown privilege for the administration to determine. 
At the time Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co. was decided, the 
issue of Crown privilege could arise only in cases litigated between 
private individuals. As Lord Simon stated, in his 1942 judgment, 
"When the Crown (which for this purpose must be taken to in-
clude a government department, or a minister of the Crown in his 
39 Id. at 639, quoting :Beatson v. Skene, 5 H. &: N. 838 at 853. 
40 Id. at 633-634. 
41 So characterized in Street, "State Secrets-A Comparative Study," 14 Mon. L. REv. 
121 at 123 (1951). 
42 WILLIAMS, CROWN PROCEEDINGS 130 (1948). 
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official capacity) is a party to a suit, it cannot be required to give 
discovery of documents at all."43 Prior to 1947, the absence of a 
right of discovery against the Crown was a natural corollary of the 
Crown's absolute immunity from suit. Under the Crown Pro-
ceedings Act, 1947, however, as is well known, most of the Crown's 
immunity from suit has been done away with. And the 1947 
statute provides expressly that "in any civil proceedings . . . to 
which the Crown is a party, the Crown may be required by the 
court to make discovery of documents and produce documents for 
inspection .... "44 But this provision is hardly intended to elim-
inate the rule of Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co. On the con-
trary, the law of Crown privilege is expressly preserved as it had 
been declared in the House of Lords decision, for section 28 (2) of 
the Crown Proceedings Act specifically states that any rule made 
under it "shall be such as to secure that the existence of a document 
will not be disclosed if, in the opinion of a Minister of the Crown, 
it would be injurious to the public interest to disclose the existence 
thereof." 
That Crown privilege can, in particular cases, all but destroy 
the right of action against the State which the Crown Proceedings 
Act gives the private citizen has been recognized by English com-
mentators themselves. As Professor Wade aptly expresses it, "Sec-
tion 28 of the Crown Proceedings Act, far from enlarging the 
liability of the Crown, offers it a protection which may very well 
deny justice to the subject."45 The public (in the words of an 
oft-cited statement by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man's 
evidence.46 And the private litigant, under modern discovery 
practice, should have an equal right to evidence in the possession 
of the other side which may be of use to him in the presentation 
of his case. Lord Simon himself stated, in his Duncan v. Gammell, 
Laird & Co. opinion, that the question of Crown privilege was one 
"of high constitutional importance, for it involves a claim by the 
executive to restrict the material which might otherwise be avail-
able for the tribunal which is trying the case. This material one 
party, at least, to the litigation may desire in his own interest to 
make available, and without it, in some cases, equal justice may be 
43 [1942] A.C. 624 at 632. 
44 IO &: 11 Geo. 6, c. 44, §28 (1) (a). 
45 Wade, "Liability in Tort of the Central Government of the United Kingdom,'' 
29 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1416 at 1429 (1954). 
46 Cited in 8 WIGMORE, A °TREATISE ON nm ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE, 3d 
ed., 64 (1940). 
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prejudiced. "47 That such prejudice to the administration of 
justice is not a matter of mere academic theory is well known to 
practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic. "Most practitioners," 
declared an eminent Q. C., "have had experience where they have 
felt that the withholding of documents by the Crown has hindered 
the effective presentation of their case."48 Even if this statement 
is somewhat exaggerated, it does indicate that the problem for the 
litigant against the Crown is a very real one. 
The effect of Crown privilege upon the right of action given by 
the Crown ·Proceedings Act is well shown by Ellis v. Home Office.49 
It arose out of an action brought under the 194 7 statute by a 
prisoner on remand on account of injuries sustained by him in 
Winchester Prison as the result of an attack upon him by one 
Hammill, a fellow prisoner, who was then under observation as a 
possible mental defective. Ellis, who suffered permanent injury, 
alleged that this was due to the negligence of those responsible for 
the management of the prison, claiming that they ought to have 
kept better supervision over a prisoner who they knew, or ought 
to have known, was likely to commit acts of violence. Whether or 
not Ellis would ultimately have succeeded in his action, of course 
nobody knows. But his case hinged largely on the prison doctor's 
reports upon Hammill and on certain statements made by eye-
witnesses at the time of the assault.50 All of this material was with-
held by the Home Secretary, acting on a claim of privilege under 
section 28 of the Crown Proceedings Act. The whole issue, Pro-
fessor Wade points out, turned upon the question of whether the 
prison doctor had reason to believe that Hammill was a person 
likely to become insanely violent. But the doctor's opinion could 
not be tested on cross-examination by reference even to the routine 
hospital reports on the man, because of the Home Secretary's re-
fusal to produce the reports.51 Ellis' dilemma in this respect was 
well stated by Devlin, J ., before whom the action was tried. "The 
plaintiff is in the unfortunate position that he has been quite un-
able to test that evidence in any way at all. The facts relating to 
Hammill's behaviour in prison are known only to the prison 
authorities. Documents, of course, are brought into existence in 
47 [1942] A.C. 624 at 629. 
48 Simon, "Evidence Excluded by Considerations of State Interest," CA.MB. L.J. 62 at 
73 (1955). 
49 (1953] 2 Q.B. 135. 
ISO Allen, 69 L.Q. REv. 449 (1953). 
ISl Wade, "Liability in Tort of the Central Government of the United Kingdom," 29 
N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1416 at 1428 (1954). See Ellis v. Home Office, [1953] 2 Q.B. 135 at 138. 
44 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
relation to that; the hospital officers prepare a daily report in 
which, of course, it would be their business to note down anything 
with regard to Hammill which was significant, because he was put 
in the C.2 wing in order that he might be kept under observation. 
Those repor.ts, if they were examined, might or might not show 
something which would lead a medical man to suppose that Ham-
mill's conduct ought to have given rise to a suspicion of violence. 
Those reports are not before the court because the defendants-
who are, of course, also the Crown-have claimed Crown privilege 
for them .... "52 
In view of the holding in Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co., 
few would disagree with Devlin, J.'s, assertion that the Home 
Secretary's claim of privilege could not sensibly be challenged.53 
At the same time, it is clear from the judgments that were delivered 
by the Court of Appeal in the Ellis case that the members of the 
appellate tribunal fully echoed the expression of Devlin, J ., of his 
"uneasy feeling that justice may not have been done because the 
material before [him] was not complete, and something more than 
an uneasy feeling that, whether justice has been done or not, it 
certainly will not appear to have been done."54 Certainly, as Single-
ton, L. J., said "That is a serious thing for a judge to have to say 
as to the administration of justice in his court.''55 
One who reads the leading judgment delivered by Lord Justice 
Singleton in the Ellis case cannot help feeling that his Lordship was 
far from convinced that the documents at issue were of such nature 
that they came within the reason behind the rule of Crown priv-
ilege. "I cannot help feeling," he declares, "that if this question 
had been considered in all its implications, both in regard to police 
documents and in regard to hospital reports, it might well have 
been found that the disclosure of most of them could not have been 
fraught with any danger- to the public interest, while it would have 
been desirable that they should be disclosed to the advisers of this 
injured plaintiff for reasons of fairness and in the interests of 
justice."56 As a matter of law, however, the entire Court of Appeal 
had to recognize, despite the anxiety which all of the judges ex-
pressed, that they were bound by the decision in Duncan v. Gam-
mell, Laird & Co. "In the result a decision of the House of Lords 
52Ellis v. Home Office, [1953] 2 Q.B. 135 at 136-137. 
53 Id. at 137. . 
54Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Id. at 144. 
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given in time of war when defense considerations were paramount 
may have operated to deny justice to an unhappy prisoner on re-
mand who, whatever the merits of the charge against him, could 
not lawfully have been assaulted in prison even by a mental 
defective. "57 
For the present writer to assert the unsoundness of the English 
law on Crown privilege is for him to follow in the footsteps of al-
most everyone who has written upon the subject. What is par-
ticularly striking to the outside observer is the rigidity of the rule 
laid down in Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co. The House of Lords 
enunciated a wholesale rule of Crown privilege: in every case, 
under its decision, the certification by a department head that a 
particular document or class of documents should not be disclosed 
is a conclusive bar to discovery of the document or documents in 
question. What the House of Lords appeared to neglect, however, 
is the fact that a wholesale rule is peculiarly inappropriate in this 
field. It is important to recognize that the nature of the document 
whose disclosure is sought may not be the same in all cases. There 
is a basic distinction between documents containing so-called 
"state secrets" and those containing only what has been termed 
"official information." In addition, we shall see, the claim of 
Crown privilege can be made in at least five different types of cases, 
not all of which should necessarily be treated alike. 
"State Secrets" 
Under Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co., all documents for 
which a claim of Crown privilege is made are dealt with similarly. 
What was overlooked by the House of Lords there, however, is that 
there is a fundamental distinction between cases involving what the 
Model Code of Evidence drafted by the American Law Institute 
calls "state secrets" and those involving other official information. 
According to the Model Code, " 'secret of state' means information 
not open or theretofore officially disclosed to the public concern-
ing the military or naval organization or plans of the United States, 
or a State or Territory, or concerning international relations."58 
The distinction between such state secrets and other official in-
117 Wade, "Liability in Tort of the Central Government of the United Kingdom," 29 
N.Y. UNIV. L. REv 1416 at 1429 (1954). 
118 Rule 227. Rule 33 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence promulgated in 1953 by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws broadens this definition to 
include information "involving the public security." 
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formation can be seen clearly by comparing the documents at 
issue in Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Go. itself with those involved 
in Robinson v. State of South Australia,59 the Privy Council deci-
sion already mentioned, which the House of Lords expressly re-
fused to follow in Duncan. In the Duncan case, as has been em-
phasized, it was secret naval plans whose disclosure was sought. 
However much one might wish to secure a fair trial to private 
litigants, the blueprints of the Thetis were documents whose dis-
closure should not be compelled. In the Robinson case, on the 
other hand, what was desired was disclosure of reports and cor-
respondence relating to wheat in a public warehouse. These were 
primarily commercial documents and, though the officials con-
cerned may have genuinely felt that their disclosure was contrary 
to the public interest, it.is certainly true that the danger or detri-
ment to which the State would have been exposed by the produc-
tion of such documents was far less obvious00 than it was in the 
case of the Thetis blueprints. Indeed, as will be pointed out, the 
absolute rule of Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Go. appears out of 
place in cases involving only such official information as that at 
issue in the Robinson case. 
Where "state secrets" of the type of the Thetis blueprints are 
the subjects of attempted discovery proceedings, few will deny 
that the House of Lords was correct in holding in Duncan that they 
should be privileged. But this does not necessarily mean that one 
must agree with Viscount Simon's decision that the administrative 
assertion of privilege must be conclusive. On the contrary, a 
strong case can be made to support the view that, even where it is 
claimed that "state secrets" are involved, the courts should go be-
hind the Ministerial declaration to see whether, in fact, Crown 
privilege has been rightfully asserted. 
The view that it is only the executive that is competent to 
decide whether the disclosure of a particular document is contrary 
to the public interest has, it is true, been forcefully stated, both by 
Lord Simon himself and other eminent jurists.61 To an outside 
observer, however, some of the reasons given to support such view 
appear specious ones. Thus, during the third reading of the 
Crown Proceedings Bill, both Viscount Simon and the Lord Chan-
119 Note 37 supra. · 
60 Compare Robinson v. State of South Australia, [1931] A.C. 704 at 722. 
61 See, e.g., the speeches in support of §28 (2) of the Crown Proceedings Act by Lords 
Jowitt and Simon and the present Lord Chancellor. 146 Lords Deb., -5th ser., cols. 923-
929; 439 H.C. Deb., 5th ser., cols. 1692-1695. 
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cellor emphasized that "if the Crown is a party to the litigation the 
Court could scarcely take a decision on the question of whether a 
particular document ought to be produced without contravening 
the elementary principle of justice that a Judge should have no 
dealings with one litigant on the matter in hand save in the pres-
ence of and in the equal knowledge of the other."62 Had this 
reason been advanced from a less eminent source, it might well 
be characterized as unworthy of serious consideration. The party 
who is not permitted to see the evidence will hardly object to an 
ex parte decision where the alternative is to deny him any court 
review of the claim of Crown privilege. The judicial solicitude to 
save the party from ex parte action leaves him only with a con-
clusive administrative determination adverse to his interest from 
which there can be no appeal, ex parte or otherwise. 
Little more worthy of weight is the claim usually advanced, in 
the words of Pollock, C. B., that the "public interest must be con-
sidered paramount to the individual interest of a suitor in a court 
of justice."63 An American jurist can hardly do better than quote 
the comment of his distinguished compatriot, John Henry Wig-
more, in answer to this claim. "As if the public interest were not 
involved in the administration of justice! As if the denial of justice 
to a single suitor were not as much a public injury as is the dis-
closure of any official record! When justice is at stake, the appeal 
to the necessities of the public interest on the other side is of no 
superior weight. 'Necessity,' as Joshua Evans said, 'is always a 
suspicious argument, and never wanting to the worst of causes.' "64 
To say that the public interest must prevail is really to beg the 
question. No one will deny that general principle or even, as has 
been conceded, that, when a genuine "secret of state" is involved, 
the public interest is against any disclosure. Yet to say thus much 
does not answer the question of whether the judge or the adminis-
trator is to decide where the public interest lies in a particular 
case. The principle asserted by Pollock, C. B., is thus irrelevant 
to the determination of whether an administrative claim of Crown 
privilege must be treated as conclusive. 
Much more substantial as a reason for the holding of executive 
conclusiveness is the inexpertness of the courts in dealing with 
62146 Lords Deb., 5th ser., cols. 924-925. See also id. at col. 929. Compare Duncan v. 
Cammell, Laird &: Co., [1942] A.C. 624 at 640. 
63 Beatson v. Skene, 5 H. &: N. 838 at 853, quoted in Duncan v. Cammell, Laird &: Co., 
[1942] A.C. 624 at 639. 
64 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 790 (1940). 
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such matters. The judge, it is said, cannot possibly inform him-
self of all the relevant factors which may or may not contribute to 
the view that a particular document contains a "state secret."65 
" ... I cannot conceive," Viscount Simon has stated, with regard 
to the question of Crown privilege, "how a Judge could have the 
material to decide it. He would need to go, in effect, and sit in 
the Minister's chair, in his Department. He would need to call 
for other documents to understand the relation of this one to 
others. He would need to learn the methods of the Department, 
and that would be perfectly impracticable."66 
It cannot be denied that, for a wholly adequate determination 
of the question of Crown privilege, the judge should have the 
knowledge of the administrator-knowledge which because of its 
technical or confidential character the judge may not, as a practical 
matter, be able to obtain.67 This is especially true today, when so 
many matters may relate to public security, particularly in the 
fields of atomic energy and scientific research. Thus, an employee· 
injured by radiation burns in an atomic power plant may sue the 
State for alleged negligence. In view of the scientific complexity 
of the field of atomic energy and the classified nature of most of 
the information relating to it, it needs no extended discussion to 
show that a judge called upon to determine whether certain docu-
ments whose discovery plaintiff desires relate to the production 
of fissionable material would have far from an easy time.68 
All of this may be conceded. But it does not follow that an 
administrative claim that a "state secret" is involved must be sub-
ject to no judicial scrutiny whatsoever. Even a judge who is not 
a technical expert in the field concerned should be able to deter-
mine whether there is a reasonable basis for the administrative 
claim and, where a "state secret" is at issue, the courts should not 
demand more. Nor, in the case of "state secrets," will it even be 
necessary in most cases for the disclosure of the secret itself to be 
forced. The judge need only be told enough to show him that 
there is a reasonable basis for the claim of privilege, which, in the 
majority of instances, should be possible without examination of 
the document at issue itself. 
61S 146 Lords Deb., 5th ser., col. 924, per Lord Jowitt. 
66 Id., cols. 928-929. 
67 Compare Haydock, "Some Evid<;ntiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security 
Requirements," 61 HARV. L. REv. 468 at 474 (1948). 
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The view just expressed finds strong support in the decision 
of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Reynolds,69 
the leading American case on the subject. It arose out of the crash 
of a military aircraft on a flight to test secret electronic equipment, 
in which certain civilian observers aboard were killed. Their 
widows sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
The plaintiffs moved for discovery of the Air Force's official acci-
dent investigation report, but the Secretary of the Air Force filed 
a claim of privilege objecting to production of the document. The 
Supreme Court appears clearly to have adopted the view that the 
determination of privilege, even where "state secrets" are involved, 
is a judicial function. At the same time, where such secrets are 
present, the courts should, if at all possible, not force any disclosure, 
even to the trial judge. "The court itself must determine whether 
the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and 
yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege 
is designed to protect."70 This necessitates, says the Court, what 
it terms a "formula of compromise."71 "Judicial control," said 
Chief Justice Vinson, "over the evidence in a case cannot be 
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers. Yet we will not go 
so far as to say that the court may automatically require a complete 
disclosure to the judge before the claim of privilege will be 
accepted in any case. It may be possible to satisfy the court, from 
all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger 
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, 
in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When 
this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and 
the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is 
meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, 
even by the judge alone, in chambers."72 
In the case under discussion, the Court felt that, from all the 
circumstances of the case, there was, at the least, a reasonable basis 
for upholding the claim that a "state secret" was involved, without 
the need for personal examination of the document at issue. As 
Chief Justice Vinson stated, "On the record before the trial court 
it appeared that this accident occurred to a military plane which 
had gone aloft to test secret electronic equipment. Certainly there 
was a reasonable danger that the accident investigation report 
69 345 U.S. 1, 73 S.Ct. 528 (1953). 
70 Id. at 8. 
71Id. at 9. 
72 Id. at 9-10. 
50 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
would contain referel!-ces to the secret electronic equipment which 
was the primary concern of the mission."73 
Under the American view, it is for the judge to determine 
whether a privilege on the ground that a "state secret" is involved 
is validly claimed. According to the Reynolds case, the judge's 
inquiry extends only to seeing whether there is a reasonable basis 
for the assertion of privilege. If he can satisfy himself that there 
is such reasonable basis from the circumstances of the case, without 
examining the document at issue, then such examination should 
not be had. In Reynolds itself, we have seen, the Court felt that 
such was the case. On the other hand, if examination of the docu-
ment itself is necessary before the judge can decide whether a 
"state secret" is really involved, he can and must make such exam-
ination. Nor, as the lower court ably stated in the Reynolds case, 
"is there any danger to the public interest in submitting the ques-
tion of privilege to the decision of the courts .. The judges of the 
United States are public officers whose responsibility under the 
Constitution is just as great as that of the heads of the executive 
departments. When Government documents are submitted to 
them in camera under a claim of privilege the judges may be 
depended upon to protect with the greatest of care the public 
interest in preventing the disclosure of matters which may fairly 
be characterized as privileged. And if, as the Government asserts 
is sometimes the case, a knowledge of background facts is necessary 
to enable one properly to pass on the claim of privilege those facts 
also may be presented to the judge in camera."74 
The view asserted above, which finds support in the decisions 
of the American courts, is not inconsistent with the overriding 
need to protect "state secrets" from public disclosure. It insists 
only upon the desirability of judicial review of at least the reason-
ableness of the claim of privilege, which, as already emphasized, 
can, in most cases, be made even without examination of the docu-
ment, concerned. If there is a reasonable danger that disclosure 
will divulge military matters or things of that type, then, of course, 
there must be an absolute prohibition on disclosure which applies· 
in all types of cases. It is recognized that such absolute bar can 
lead to unfairness to particular litigants. A plaintiff who is un-
fortunate enough to have his case based upon a secret-service con-
'13Id. at 10. 
''14 Reynolds v. United States, (3d Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 987 at 997-998. 
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tract,75 the design of an armor-piercing shell,76 or the design of a 
naval range-keeper,77 can hardly get a fair day in court if the mat-
ters at issue are wholly privileged. Where "state secrets" are so 
clearly involved, however, the interest of the litigant must give way 
to the public interest against any disclosure. The most that the 
litigant can ask for is that the judge determine that there is a real 
basis for the claim that a "state secret" is involved before he bars 
discovery. 
"Official Information" 
Duncan v. Gammell, Laird &- Co., as already emphasized, in-
volved "state secrets" of a type which, all will agree, ought clearly 
to be protected from public disclosure. But the opinion of Vis-
count Simon in that case was by no means limited to documents 
involving such secrets. Its language applies instead to all official 
information for which a claim of Crown privilege is made. Accord-
ing to the American Model Code of Evidence, which appears to 
have been the first clearly to make the distinction between "state 
secrets" and what it terms "official information,"78 the latter 
"means information not open or theretofore officially disclosed to 
the public relating to internal affairs of this State or of the United 
States acquired by a public official of this State or the United States 
in the course of his duty, or transmitted from one such official to 
another in the course of duty."79 
Disclosure of official information other than "state secrets" 
would appear to have no adverse effect upon public security. What 
is involved in such information are not military or naval secrets, of 
the type of the Thetis blueprints or the report on secret electronic 
equipment at issue in the Reynolds case, but other governmental 
communications which, for one reason or another, may not have 
been made public. Whatever the reasons for their non-disclosure 
may have been, they relate to what is conceived to be the proper 
internal functioning of government and not to securing the public 
75 See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
76 See Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., (D.C. Pa. 1912) 199 F. 353. 
77 See Pollen v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 673 (1937); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 
(D.C. N.Y. 1939) 26 F. Supp. 583. The examples used are taken from Haydock, "Some 
Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements," 61 HAR.v. L. REv. 
468 at 482 (1948). 
78 The distinction was, however, anticipated in WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2378 
(1940). 
79 Rule 228. A similar definition is contained in Rule 34 of the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence, referred to in note 58 supra. 
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safety or defense of the realm.80 This is shown clearly by a case like 
the already-discussed decision of t:Jie Court of Appeal in Ellis v. 
Home Office.81 The medical and police reports whose disclosure 
was sought in that case can, by no stretch of the imagination, be 
said to involve "state secrets," in ·the sense in which we have used 
that term. What was really involved in Ellis was the dossier of a 
prisoner, which the Home Office wished kept confidential; but 
this is a long way from the case where, in Viscount Simon's phrase, 
"disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good dip-
lomatic relations."82 As has been underlined, however, Duncan 
v. Gammell., Laird & Co. makes no distinction between "state 
secrets" like the Thetis blueprints and official information like 
that at issue in the Ellis case. The Court of Appeal in Ellis con-
sequently felt bound, under the wholesale rule of privilege laid 
down by the House of Lords, to deny disclosure. Indeed, as Single-
ton, L. J., aptly pointed out, the Ellis case shows clearly how wide 
an interpretation may be put on the words of Lord Simon in Dun-
can v. Gammell., Laird & Co.83 
Where other than "state secrets" are involved, whether or not 
disclosure should be compelled should depend upon the type of 
case in which the issue arises. It is not generally recognized in 
British discussions of the subject that the question of Crown priv-
ilege for official information can arise in at least five different 
kinds of cases, not all of which should necessarily be treated alike. 
The cases referred to are (1) criminal proceedings; (2) civil pro-
ceedings with the Crown as party plaintiff; (3) civil proceedings 
with the Crown as party defendant; (4) proceedings in which the 
Crown is not a party; and (5) proceedings in which disclosure of 
the records of public authorities other than the Crown is sought.84 
Criminal Proceedings. The proper approach to be followed 
where claims of governmental privilege are invoked to prevent 
disclosure of official information in criminal proceedings is that 
articulated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Andol-
schek.85 In that case, defendants were tax inspectors of a federal 
so Paraphrasing the language used in the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914-the famous 
DORA of World War I. 
81 Note 49 supra. 
82 Duncan v. Camm.ell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 at 642. Compare Wade, "Liability 
in Tort of the Central Government of the United Kingdom," 29 N.Y. UNIV. L R.Ev. 1416 
at 1429 (1954). 
83 Ellis v. Home Office, [1953] 2 Q.B. 135 at 144. 
~ Compare note, 29 N.Y. UNIV. L R.Ev. 194 at 201-211 (1954). 
85 (2d Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 503. 
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agency who were tried criminally for a conspiracy which included 
their taking of bribes. They sought discovery and the introduction 
in evidence of certain reports which they had made to their supe-
riors in their official capacity. According to Judge Hand, the gov-
ernment could not claim privilege for these official reports in such 
a criminal proceeding. "While we must accept it as lawful," states 
his opinion, "for a department of the government to suppress docu-
ments, even when they will help determine controversies between 
third persons, we cannot agree that this should include their sup-
pression in a criminal prosecution, founded upon those very deal-
ings to which the documents relate, and whose criminality they 
will, or may, tend to exculpate. So far as they directly touch the 
criminal dealings, the prosecution necessarily ends any confidential 
character the documents may possess; it must be conducted in the 
open, and will lay bare their subject matter. The government 
must choose; either it must leave the transactions in the obscurity 
from which a trial will draw them, or it must expose them fully."86 
Under Judge Hand's approach, when the government under-
takes a criminal prosecution, it waives any privilege it might other-
wise have against disclosure of official information which may be 
relevant to the criminal action. In a criminal proceeding, there is 
both the traditional interest of our law in safeguarding the rights 
of the accused and the fact that the prosecuting government itself 
determines the classification of restricted material. 87 The govern-
ment cannot have it both ways. If it wishes to keep the particular 
documents secret, it cannot go ahead with the prosecution. If it 
is more interested in seeing that the accused does not escape the 
sanction of the criminal law, it must not deny him access to relevant 
material under its control. In the criminal field, Chief Justice 
Vinson has said, "the Government can invoke its evidentiary priv-
ileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free. The 
rationale of the criminal cases is that, since the Government which 
prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, 
it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then 
invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of any-
thing which might be material to his defense."88 In a criminal 
case any public policy militating against public disclosure of 
official information must give way to the interest of the accused in 
86 Id. at 506. 
87 Compare Haydock, "Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security 
Requirements," 61 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 468 at 480 (1948). 
88 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 at 12, 73 S.Ct. 528 (1958). 
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having the information for use in making a defense to the charge.89 
It is true that the prosecution must be protected against harassing 
demands for irrelevant official information. But this can be done 
easily enough by allowing the judge to order the information to be 
produced for his inspection in camera so that he may determine 
whether it is really relevant to the criminal proceeding.90 
At first glance what has just been said appears utterly incon-
sistent with Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co. It should, however, 
be noted that Viscount Simon there took pains to declare expressly 
that "The judgment of the House in the present case is limited to 
civil actions and the practice, as applied'in criminal trials where an 
individual's life or liberty may be at stake, is not necessarily the 
same."91 Even under the House of Lords decision in Duncan, it 
can thus be argued that the rule of absolute Crown privilege need 
not necessarily apply to criminal proceedings. In such proceed-
ings, on the contrary, it is submitted that the doctrine of waiver 
enunciated by Judge Learned Hand is one which comports more 
fully with the basic interest of the criminal law in safeguarding the 
rights of the accused. 
Civil Proceedings With Crown as Plaintiff. The dictum of 
Lord Simon just quoted is clearly limited to criminal trials. There 
is ~onsequently no legal justification for distinguishing between 
different types of civil proceedings, so far as the applicability of 
the rule of Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co. is concerned. At the 
same time, however, it can be argued that many of the considera-
tions which apply to criminal cases apply as well to proceedings 
instituted by the Crown as party plaintiff. In such cases, too, it 
can be said, if the government chooses to commence an action, it 
should stand in the position of the private litigant and be held to 
waive any privilege against disclosure of official information which 
it might possess if it were not a party to the litigation.92 Although 
this argument is wholly inconsistent with the present law in 
Britain, it is receiving increasing support from courts in the United 
States. As one American judge expressed it, it is but a short step, 
and a necessary one, from the rule in criminal cases discussed above 
to the rule that where the government is the complainant in a civil 
89 United States v. Schneiderman, (D.C. Cal. 1952) 106 F. Supp. 731 at 736. 
90 Id. at 734. 
91 [1942] A.C. 624 at 633-634. 
92 Compare note, 29 N.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 194 at 204 (1954), 
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suit it should likewise be required to make its own choice-either 
to make disclosure or to drop the suit.93 
Civil Proceedings With Crown as Defendant. There is little 
doubt that the use of the Crown privilege doctrine in cases brought 
under the Crown Proceedings Act, 194 7, has given rise to most of 
the recent criticism of that doctrine in Britain. Speaking of Crown 
privilege in Ellis v. Home Office, Devlin, J., declared, "It is a rule, 
of course, which is particularly unfortunate when the person who 
is responsible for deciding whether they should be disclosed or not 
happens also to be the defendant in the action in which he is being 
sued. It means that every litigant against a government depart-
ment-and such litigation is becoming more and more frequent 
as the sphere of government activities is extended-is denied, as a 
matter of course, the elementary right of checking the evidence of 
government witnesses against the contemporary documents."94 In 
a case like Ellis v. Home Office, indeed, we have seen, the doctrine 
of Crown privilege all but defeats the right to sue the State which 
is given by the Crown Proceedings Act. 
A number of American decisions apply the theory already dis-
cussed of waiver of privilege by the government to cases brought 
under the American equivalent of the Crown Proceedings Act. 
Their reasoning is that the State, by consenting to be sued, has 
waived its privilege against disclosure of official information, just 
as it does when it institutes a criminal proceeding. It should be 
borne in mind that the Federal Tort Claims Act and other Ameri-
can statutes authorizing suits against the State contain no limita-
tions such as that in section 28 (2) of the Crown Proceedings Act, 
which, as has been pointed out, expressly preserves the Crown 
privilege rule. That being the case, American judges have been 
able to read into the State's consent to suit a consent to waive its 
privilege against disclosure of official information. "The consent, 
being general, amounts to an endorsement of the libel95 with the 
sovereign's command 'Soit droit fait al partie'. (Let right be done 
93 Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 801 at 803. A striking 
case applying this principle is United States v. Cotton Valley Oil Operators Committee, 
(D.C. La. 194~) 9 F.R.D. 719, affd. per-curiam by equally divided Court, 339 U.S. 940, 70 
S.Ct. 793 (1950), where an antitrust action by the government was dismissed because of 
its failure to submit documents whose disclosure was sought by discovery proceedings. 
94 [1953] 2 Q.B. 135 at 138. 
95 This was an. admiralty suit, hence the use of this term. 
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to the party). But right cannot be done if the government is 
allowed to suppress the facts in its possession."96 
Crown Not a Party. The problems that may arise where a 
claim of Crown privilege is made in proceedings in which the 
Crown is not a party were brought into sharp focus by the recent 
case of Broome v. Broome.91 It arose out of a petition by a wife 
for divorce on the ground of cruelty. The husband denied that 
he had been guilty of cruelty and claimed that the wife had been 
guilty of adultery. The husband was a regular soldier and, as the 
case developed, it was important to determine the circumstances in 
which the wife was received by the husband on her arrival in Hong 
Kong, where he was stationed. At the time, there had been in 
Hong Kong a representative of the Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's 
Families Association (SSAF A), one Mrs. Allsop. Differences had 
arisen between the husband and wife, and her good offices were 
invoked. She had made written reports of the case to her head 
office. The wife caused two subpoenas to be issued. The first was a 
subpoena ad testificandum directed to Mrs. Allsop. The second was 
a subpoena duces tecum served upon the Secretary of State for 
War, requiring him to bring letters, copies of letters, memoranda 
and records made by SSAF A concerning the wife and husband. 
The second subpoena was directed to the Secretary of State for War 
because all the relevant SSAF A documents· had come into the 
possession of the War Office. Application was made on behalf of 
the Crown to have both subpoenas set aside, and counsel for the 
Crown produced a certificate by the Secretary of State for War. 
The Secretary's certificate stated: "I have read the correspondence 
and notes covered by the subpoena issued to me . . . and I have 
considered the evidence which Mrs. Gwenneth Mary Allsop could 
give, as set out in a statement taken from her and submitted to the 
Treasury Solicitor . . . and I am of opinion that it is not in the 
public interest that the documents should be produced or the 
evidence of Mrs. Allsop given orally." 
As far as the documents in question were concerned, the court 
was, of course, bound by Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co. Accord-
ing to Sachs, J., the rule of that case applies to any document in 
96 Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 76 F. Supp. 801 at 804. There is 
a short statement to the contrary in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 at 12, 73 S.Ct. 
528 (1953). As already pointed out, however, that case involved military secrets and is not 
relevant to a case not involving such "state secrets." See note, 29 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 194 
at 205 (1954). 
97 [1955] 2 W.L.R. 401,402. 
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the physical possession of the Crown-and that irrespective of 
where the document originates or in whose custody it reposes.98 
As the documents were in the possession of an agent of the Crown, 
Crown privilege consequently attached to them even though they 
had emanated from SSAF A, an independent body. The claim of 
privilege made in the Broome case was not, however, limited to the 
documents whose disclosure was sought. The Crown also sought 
to have the subpoena addressed to Mrs. Allsop set aside, on the 
ground that it was not in the public interest that her evidence be 
given. In his argument, counsel for the Crown made what has 
been termed the remarkable claim99 "that a Minister of the Crown 
could give a certificate that the giving of evidence by any specified 
witness (whether or not a servant or agent of the Crown) as to any 
set of facts or class of facts would be contrary to the public interest, 
_and that once that certificate was given those facts could not be given 
in evidence in court by the witness."100 The sole authority asserted 
for this all-embracing "privilege by unexaminable certificate" (as 
Sachs, J., aptly described it101 ) was the dictum of Viscount Simon in 
the Duncan case: "The present opinion is concerned only with the 
production of documents, but it seems to me that the same prin-
ciple must also apply to the exclusion of oral evidence which, if 
given, would jeopardize the interests of the community."102 
English writers have assumed that the dictum of Lord Simon 
was intended to apply as broadly as the rule laid down in Duncan 
itself, i.e., to all oral evidence where a claim of Crown privilege is 
made. One wonders whether his lordship necessarily meant to 
go so far. It is true that, in a case like Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & 
Co., where military secrets were involved, the privilege must ex-
tend to oral evidence which might lead to any disclosure of the 
secrets. And it is also true that, insofar as Crown privilege for 
documents containing official information other than "state 
secrets" is recognized, the privilege must logically apply equally 
to oral testimony concerning the contents of such documents.103 
But it does not necessarily follow from this that the rule of con-
clusive Crown privilege must apply to oral testimony not con-
nected with documents for which privilege may be claimed. The 
98 Id. at 404. 
99 Note, 71 L.Q. R.Ev. 172 at 173 (1955). 
100 [1955] 2 W.L.R. 401 at 405. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 at 643. 
10s Moss v. Chesham. U.D.C., Jan. 16, 1945, unreported, quoted in Simon, "Evidence 
Excluded by Considerations of State Interest," CAMB. L.J. 62 at 69 (1955). 
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implications of the Crown's far-reaching claim in the Broome case 
were acutely noted by Sachs, J.: "Should it be an issue in a civil 
action, for instance, whether A stole money or goods from B, Mr. 
Winn submitted it would be competent for a Minister of the 
Crown to certify that it was contrary to the public interest for a 
witness who saw the theft to give evidence to that effect. Accord-
ing to Mr. Winn the sole test as to whether the privilege attached 
was the opinion of a Minister that for the witness to give that piece 
of evidence was contrary to the public interest-an opinion into 
which he submitted the court could make no inquiry."104 The 
Crown could, in other words, prevent any and every witness from 
giving any evidence simply by certifying that his testimony should 
be excluded. 
It is interesting to note the justification stated by the Crown 
for its attempt to use its asserted privilege in Broome v. Broome. 
The reason for seeking to exclude the evidence of Mrs. Allsop was 
stated to be the desire of the Crown to ensure that those works of 
SSAF A concerned with maintaining good relations between a serv-
ing husband and wife, and in particular its attempts at reconcilia-
tion, should be given the same sort of protection from disclosure in 
court as the efforts of probation officers and others specifically 
concerned with matrimonial reconciliation.105 It may well be that 
the protection desired by the Crown should be given to evidence 
of the type involved. But the question of whether such evidence 
should be privileged in a court of law should surely be one for the 
courts themselves, in the absence of statutory provisions on the 
matter. In the Broome case itself, Sachs, J., did not really have to 
decide whether Crown privilege in such a case extended, as the 
Crown contended, to "a general power wholly to suppress evidence 
from every source of facts merely upon the unexaminable opinion 
of a Minister as to what that Minister regarded as the public inter-
est. "106 This was true because the learned judge held that the 
claim to Crown privilege failed- on an issue of procedure, since, 
according to Sachs, J., even assuming that the Minister concerned 
could claim privilege in regard to any particular oral evidence, it 
would be wrong for the Minister to interpose a blanket claim of 
privilege which would prevent the witness from giving any evi-
dence whatsoever of any sort.107 As expressed in the court's judg-
104 Broome v. Broome, [1955] 2 W.L.R. 401 at 405. 
105 Id. at 406. See Simon, "Evidence Excluded by Considerations of State Interest," 
CAMB. L.J. 62 at 63 (1955). 
106 [1955] ·2 W.L.R. 401 at 407. 
101 See note, 71 L.Q. REv. 172 at 173 (1955). 
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ment, "any certificate in a 'blanket form' which stopped a witness 
going into the witness-box seems contrary in principle to those 
portions of the decided cases which enjoin Ministers before giving 
a certificate as regards documents to examine each in tum in the 
light of the issues arising in the case."108 
Though his holding that the claim of Crown privilege failed 
on the procedural point rendered it unnecessary for Sachs, J ., to 
decide whether_ the privilege as claimed by the Crown existed, the 
learned judge did state in his judgment that he had not been per-
suaded of the existence of the privilege in the terms in which it 
was submitted to him. Indeed, he intimated that, even if the 
Crown might be held to have the privilege to prevent oral testi-
mony, it should "be circumscribed by reference to certain specific 
heads of public interest, such as the safety of the realm, inter-
national relations, or the prevention and detection of crime."100 
This, it should be noted, is to distinguish between "state secrets" 
and other official information (much as the present writer has done 
in the discussion above), limiting the privilege to cases where "state 
secrets" may be involved. In the Broome case itself, it is important 
to bear in mind, nothing of the kind referred to by Sachs, J ., was 
involved. The testimony of Mrs. Allsop, which the Crown sought 
to prevent, was directly relevant to the question of the husband's 
alleged cruelty. She was able to testify as to the way in which the 
husband actually received the wife when she arrived in Hong Kong 
and it seems, in fact, that her evidence helped convince the court 
that the charge of cruelty was not made out. Looking at the report 
of the case, it is indeed difficult to see why the Crown ever tried 
to prevent her testimony. As Sachs, J., put it, "On all those points 
her evidence was of assistance to the court; on none of them was 
there any apparent cause for any intervention in the name of 
Crown privilege."110 Even counsel for the Crown appeared to 
concede that nothing had happened which really called for inter-
vention by the Crown, even if the privilege existed.111 Yet, if the 
extreme claim of the Crown had been accepted, the testimony, so 
directly relevant to the doing of justice in the case, could never 
have been heard by the court. 
The rejection in Broome v. Broome of the extreme claim of the 
Crown (at least in the way it was there made) conclusively to ex-
108 Broome v. Broome, [1955] 2 W.L.R. 401 at 406-407. 
109 Id. at 408. 
110 Id. at 408-409. 
111 Id. at 409. 
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elude any and all oral testimony by the simple assertion of Crown 
privilege does not, it should be emphasized, in any way affect the 
right of the Crown to bar disclosure of documentary evidence 
( or oral testimony concerning documents for which privilege may 
be claimed) in proceedings in which the Crown is not a party. 
That such right exists in suits between private individuals, as in 
suits under the Crown Proceedings Act, is, indeed, clear when one 
recalls that Duncan v. Gammell, Laird & Co. itself was an action 
between private parties. Under the Duncan decision, a~ already 
pointed out, there is no distinction between "state secrets" and 
other official information: the conclusive claim of privilege can 
be made by the Crown regardless of what kind of information is 
involved in the case. In Broome v. Broome, the documents whose 
disclosure was barred by the Ministerial certificate could not, by 
any stretch of the imagination, be deemed to relate to "state 
secrets." They involved rather undisclosed information which the 
administration sought to keep in obscurity for reasons of policy 
not related to the security of the State. 
There appears to be some justification for allowing the State 
to bar the disclosure of official information in suits to which the 
State is not a party, even if one agrees with the view expressed in the 
American cases already referred to, under which the State waives 
whatever privilege it might otherwise have by appearing as a party. 
When the State is itself a party, there is a real danger that the doc-
trine of Crown privilege will be used to advance the government's 
position as litigant. As was aptly pointed out, during the debate 
on the Crown Proceedings Bill, the "public interest" for which 
Crown privilege may be claimed may well be deemed to include 
the winning of the government's suit in court. A" ... Minister, 
acting conscientiously, might say, 'My duty, first and foremost, is 
to the public interest. I think it is better in the public interest 
that we should win, and, therefore, I shall not disclose documents 
which might cause us to lose the case. I would not be doing my 
duty if I did so.' "112 It is true, as the attorney-general declared, 
that the doctrine of Crown privilege should not be so used to defeat 
the cause of justice.113 When the Crown is a party, however, and 
has a direct stake in the outcome of the case, there is always the 
chance of arbitrary suppression. Although the claim of privilege 
is made in the name of the Minister, he acts upon the recommenda-
tion of his subordinates directly concerned with the case, whose 
112 439 H.C. Deb., 5th ser., col. 172:7. 
113Ibid. 
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only concern, all too often, may be the winning of that case at all 
costs. In considering the public interest in these cases, one should, 
as Morris, L. J., has said, bear in mind that it is "one element of 
the public interest that regard should be had to the du~ adminis-
tration of justice in such manner that it should always be done, 
and should be seen to be done."114 When Crown privilege bars 
the disclosure of evidence in a case where the Crown itself is a 
litigant, this desideratum is certainly not fully met. 
Where on the other hand, the suit is between private individ-
uals alone and the State has no direct interest in the outcome, there 
is much less danger of Crown privilege being used for the arbitrary 
suppression of evidence. And this is why many American cases 
permit the State to claim privilege for official information in cases 
in which the State is not a party.115 It should, however, be empha-
sized that, even under them, the rule on this side of the Atlantic 
does not begin to approach the doctrine of "privilege by unexam-
inable certificate" enunciated by the House of Lords in Duncan 
v. Gammell, Laird & Co. The court in the United States may still 
examine the evidence for which privilege is claimed to determine 
whether the claim of privilege is a valid one. And, where only 
official information not involving "state secrets" is at issue, it would 
seem that the American courts would not follow the approach of 
United States v. Reynolds, already discussed, under which the 
judge looks only to see whether there is a reasonable danger that 
compulsion of the evidence will expose matters which should not 
be divulged. That approach is valid only where "state secrets" are 
involved. In the case of other official information, the judge should 
determine himself whether there is, in fact, a public interest in 
barring disclosure. Only then should the claim of privilege be up-
held, even in cases in which the State does not have the direct 
interest of a litigant. 
Public Authorities Other Than Crown. According to Scott, 
L. J., in Blackpool Corporation v. Locker,116 nothing analogous 
to Crown privilege has yet been conceded by the courts to any local 
government officer. Indeed, it is generally assumed by English 
writers that public authorities other than the Crown do not enjoy 
any privilege to bar the disclosure of documents or other evidence. 
It is to be noted that the distinction made in Britain between de-
114 Ellis v. Home Office, [1953] 2 W.B. 135 at 147. 
115 The leading case is Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 20 S.Ct. 701 (1900). 
110 [1948] 1 K.B. 349 at 380. 
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partments of the central government and other public authorities 
tends to be followed as well on this side of the Atlantic. The 
American courts too look with disfavor upon assertions by admin-
istrative agencies other than those of the federal government of a 
privilege against disclosure of official information.117 
The fact that local authorities and other governmental organs 
which have thus been denied any right of Crown privilege have 
been able to function effectively despite the denial indicates that 
advocates of a wholesale rule of privilege overstate their case when 
they assert that such wholesale privilege is a sine qua non to the 
effective functioning of the central government. If that assertion 
has substance, is it not also applicable to public authorities other 
than the Crown?118 
Conclusion 
The aspect of the law of Crown privilege that is most repugnant 
to an outside observer is, without any doubt, its complete elimina-
tion of judicial control. Under Duncan v. Gammell, Laird &- Co., 
as we have repeatedly emphasized, the courts cannot go behind a 
ministerial claim of privilege. As Lord J owitt has expressed it, 
"the final decision as to whether a document should or should not 
be produced must be left, in the words of Lord Parker in a famous 
case, the Zamora, to 'those who are responsible for the national 
security, who must be the sole judges of what the national security 
requires.' "119 
The difficulty with this view is that it assumes that the admin-
istrative answer to the question of public interest will necessarily 
coincide with the true interest of the public in all cases. One won-
ders, however, whether it is realistic to expect the administration 
always to weigh wisely and impartially the total public interest 
against its own convenience. One must consider the matter in the 
framework of administrative realities. The diffusion of power in 
government departments often lodges actual responsibility in the 
fourth or fifth tier of the administrative hierarchy. A subordinate 
immediately concerned with a case may not bring to it the com-
plete objectivity of a Lord Chancellor. To make the head of the 
department the ultimate arbiter of disclosure is, under these cir-
cumstances, no real guaranty that the determination will be based 
117 See note, 29 N.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 194 at 209 (1954). 
118 Compare Street, "State Secrets-A Comparative Study," 14 Mon. L. R.Ev. 121 at l!lO 
(1951). 
119146 Lords Deb., 5th ser., col. 924, quoting from The Zamora, [1916] 2 A.C. 77 at 107. 
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upon sound principles of public interest.120 The Minister will 
inevitably take cognizance of the public interest as it is seen from 
his own departmental angle, including its administrative con-
venience.121 "Under the normal administrative routine the ques-
tion will come to him with recommendations from cautious sub-
ordinates against disclosure and in the press of business the chief 
is likely to approve the recommendation about such a seemingly 
minor matter without much· independent consideration."122 
To ensure that departmental convenience is not equated to 
public interest, there should be independent scrutiny of the claim 
of privilege. Such scrutiny can be best made by the judge before 
whom the claim of privilege is asserted. A Canadian judge aptly 
stated almost a century ago, with regard to the question of who 
should have the final word in cases of the type under discussion, 
"are you to compare the discretion, the unbiassed mind, the posi-
tion of the judge who is alike independent of the Crown and of the 
people, who is free from party spirit, who knows or should know 
no one, to the biassed mind, naturally, necessarily, biassed mind 
of a politician, not independent as the judge is but dependent 
upon a party, who knows or must know the contending parties, 
and may have the most cogent reasons for supporting one party, 
in preference to another; who has to bear, and does bear the ex-
ternal pressure which the judge is or should be inaccessible to; 
whose interest it may be, under the flimsy pretense, under the 
transparent veil of pretended public interest, to screen some petty 
minion in office? The comparison cannot hold for a moment. In 
the case of the judge, you have sacred guarantees; in that of a 
politician, you have none. External pressure will curb down the 
politician, whilst you will behold the judge more erect than ever, 
calmly and firmly resisting and baffling its baneful influence. 
Clearly then, manifestly, should it be left to the judge on the Bench, 
in his discretion, to determine the question .... "123 
In the United States, as has been shown, there may be judicial 
inquiry into governmental claims of privilege, regardless of the 
kind of information whose disclosure the administration seeks to 
bar. Even if the rule of conclusive privilege of Duncan v. Gammell, 
120 See Berger and Krash, "Government Immunity From Discovery," 59 YALE L.J. 1451 
at 1463 (1950). 
121 See Simon, "Evidence Excluded by Considerations of State Interest," CAMs. LJ. 
62 at 75 (1955). 
122 McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 307 (1954). 
123 Gugy v. Maguire, 13 Low. Can. 33 at 44 (1863), quoted in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 
3d ed., 800 (1940). 
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Laird & Co. is sound when limited to "state secrets" such as the 
Thetis blueprints (and the present writer is far from conceding 
even that), that does not justify the application of that rule in cases 
involving other official information. Where such information is 
concerned, there can be no adverse effect by disclosure upon public 
safety or the defense of the realm. It is consequently difficult to see 
what harm could be done to the public interest by allowing the 
judges to examine such information to see whether disclosure 
should be precluded. Where "state secrets" are not involved, the 
document at issue, more likely than not, is known to a number of 
people at many levels in the -administrative hierarchy. Shall every 
subordinate in the department have access to the information, and 
not the presiding officer of justice?124 In such a case, points out an 
M.P., a great many people know that the document whose dis-
closure is sought exists. "The Treasury Solicitor knows that it 
exists. So does his typist who copies it, his office boy who takes it to 
counsel, and counsel who is briefed by the Treasury Solicitor. He 
knows what is in it; otherwise, how can the privilege be claimed? 
Is it suggested that a judge of the high court is less to be trusted 
with the knowledge of this secret than all those people?"125 
One can, indeed, go further and ask why there should be any 
privilege for evidence which does not involve any "state secrets." 
If such evidence is directly relevant to a judicial inquiry, why 
should the administrative desire to keep it in obscurity be per-
mitted to defeat the ends of justice? If the public safety or defense 
of the realm will not be affected, why should departmental con-
venience weigh more heavily than the proper resolution of cases 
by the courts? It will, however, be said that, even though official 
information may not contain "state secrets," its disclosure may not 
be in the public interest. Thus, it is claimed that administration 
might be seriously hampered if departmental files were liable to 
be made public in litigation. This is asserted to be particularly 
true of reports and intra-departmental communications where, in 
the words of Lord Simon, "the candour and completeness of such 
communications might be prejudiced if they were ever liable to be 
disclosed in subsequent litigation .... "126 "It really comes down 
124 Id. at 799. 
125 439 H.C. Deb., 5th ser., col. 1725. 
126 Duncan v. Gammell, Laird &: Co., [1942] A.C. 624 at 635. 
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to reports from civil servants," the present Lord Chancellor has 
stated, "and the basis is that if you are to make all confidential 
reports by civil servants disclosable, then the result will be that 
the State will not have the advantage of as clear, honest and forth-
right reports from its civil servants, as it would if they were pro-
tected. "127 
It is submitted, with all respect to the eminent authorities just 
cited, that their view is based upon a priori reasoning which may 
or may not be consistent with the facts of administrative life. "Is it 
proved that employees make reports less honestly if they think 
that there is the slightest possibility of someone other than their 
employers seeing them at some future time?"128 If the views of 
Lords Simon and Kilmuir in this respect are sound, why should 
they not apply with equal force to the reports of local authorities 
and private reports for which there is no privilege? If the reason 
asserted were valid, it should, as Mr. Silverman well states, "apply 
not only to the State but . . . to the London County Council, a 
good many public authorities all over the country, and, indeed, 
insurance companies and many other bodies which send out offi-
cers to make investigations. These people are not entitled to claim 
this privilege on the ground that they would get less honest reports. 
Why should the State do so?"129 It has never been shown that pub-
lic authorities other than the Crown and private bodies, which do 
not possess any privilege in these matters, have really been im-
paired by such lack. In truth, it seems most unlikely that a con-
scientious civil servant would actually be affected by the remote 
possibility that what he writes in a report may ultimately see the 
light of day in the courtroom. Even if he is somewhat restrained, 
it does not necessarily follow that that is an unmitigated evil. It 
is hard to see how the work of a department is impaired if its offi-
cials purge their correspondence and reports of the intemperate 
type of comment that is all too often found to abound in depart-
mental files. 
The administrative reluctance to make full disclosure to the 
public is, without a doubt, one of the critical problems of present-
day public law. The time has not yet come in the Anglo-American 
127 439 H.C. Deb., 5th ser., col. 1692. 
128 Street, "State Secrets-A Comparative Study," 14 MOD. L. REv. 121 at 130 (1951). 
129 439 H.C. Deb., 5th ser., col. 1726. 
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world when deliberate official misuse of the privilege of secrecy is 
rife. But the vast extension of administrative authority presents 
an ever larger scope for the claim of privilege. "Indeed it requires 
no great flight of imagination to realize that if the Government's 
contentions in these cases were affirmed the privilege against dis-
closure might gradually be enlarged by executive determinations 
until, as is the case in some nations today, it embraced the whole 
range of governmental activities."130 The possibilities of abuse are 
plainly latent in the privilege. There is needed only the willing-
ness to exercise them.131 
130 Reynolds v. United States, (lld Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 987 at 995. 
131 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, lld ed., 791 (1940). 
